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Abstract This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and
a potential entrant. Production by both firms causes polluting emissions. The govern-
ment selects a tax per unit of emission to maximize social welfare. The size of the tax
rate affects whether or not the potential entrant enters the market. We identify the con-
ditions that create a market structure where the preferences of the government and the
incumbent firm coincide. Interestingly, there are cases where both the government and
incumbent firm prefer a monopoly. Hence, the government might induce profitable
monopolization by using a socially optimal tax policy instrument.
Keywords Taxes · Market structure · Environmental pollution · Monopoly
JEL Classifications H23 · L12 · Q58
1 Introduction
Over the last couple of decades environmental policy has become a major device in
addressing and shaping industries’ use of environmental and natural resources. In this
respect, two important issues come forward: (i) the (optimal) relationship between
environmental policy and market structure, i.e., the number of firms within a mar-
ket (e.g., Buchanan 1969; Barnett 1980; Misiolek 1980; Baumol and Oates 1988;
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Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas 1995; Carraro et al. 1996),1 and (ii) who the winners
and losers of environmental policy are (e.g., Jordan 1972; Buchanan and Tullock 1975;
Maloney and McCormick 1982).2 Regarding issue (i) it is well known that taxes are
superior to command-and-control regulation in terms of achieving efficiency in pol-
lution control activities. However, taxes might not be the preferred instrument when
addressing issue (ii).
In their seminal article, Buchanan and Tullock (1975) compare effluent taxes and
quotas and argue that regulated industries tend to prefer quotas to effluent charges, since
the former create a higher degree of “industry cartelization” (or “monopolization”)
and as such would yield higher industry profit. Dewees (1983) also demonstrated that
existing firms may prefer standards to market-based policies, such as taxes. The idea is
that incumbent firms are not necessarily harmed by imposed environmental policy but
can gain an advantage out of it. For instance, in a positive theoretical setting Maloney
and McCormick (1982) show that environmental control measures may deliver rents
to regulated firms. That is, the active pursuit by incumbent firms for more stringent
regulation can be used as a strategic tool to “raising rivals’ costs” (e.g., Salop and
Scheffman 1983; Simpson 1995).3 By raising the costs as induced by regulatory con-
trols, output is reduced and prices subsequently tend to increase, which can generate
higher profits in case entry is restricted. The theoretical prediction that environmental
controls can act as an entry deterrence device has recently also found empirical sup-
port by the study of Helland and Matsuno (2003). They particularly find that larger
firms may benefit from increased compliance costs. Thus, the above suggests that
command-and-control policies could lead to industry cartelization.
Given this important policy effect on industry structure and firm performance, our
paper adds to the above literature by focusing specifically on environmental taxes.
The aim is to examine under which conditions such taxes may create both a bene-
ficial market outcome to the regulated industry and a beneficial welfare outcome to
the government, where welfare includes an environmental quality argument. That is,
we identify the conditions that create a market structure where the preferences of
the government and the incumbent firm coincide, which implies a lower degree of
competition in the market.
In a well-known article, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) look at the effect of
an effluent tax on the number of firms in an oligopolistic market setting. In the first
stage of the game the government sets the (welfare-maximizing) tax rate. In the second
stage, all firms decide whether or not to enter the industry, which is subsequently fol-
lowed by competition in the output market. Shaffer (1995) and Lee (1999) do a similar
exercise but then with an output tax instead of an effluent tax. The main difference
1 See also Lee (1975), Conrad and Wang (1993), Shaffer (1995, 2001), Simpson (1995) and Lee (1999)
for theoretical contributions, and OECD (1995) for a general discussion of issue (i). In a seminal article
Ellis and Fellner (1943) showed that market power alters the optimal tax in the presence of externalities in
general.
2 See Pearson (1995) for a practical discussion of this issue and Farzin (2003, 2004) for a theoretical
coverage of both issue (i) and (ii).
3 Puller (2006) provides a recent study on how firms in a concentrated industry have an incentive to innovate
so as to intensify the pursuit for more stringent environmental regulation in order to raise their rivals’ costs.
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with the aforementioned literature is that we address a market structure in which an
incumbent firm is already active in the output market, whereas the previous literature
considers the situation that all firms have to decide whether or not to enter the industry
before they start producing. We believe that our setting is more appropriate in those
cases where a government introduces environmental taxes in a market that already
exists. Moreover, it enables us to examine whether or not an existing firm will benefit
from environmental taxes.
Our model considers a market for a homogeneous good with an incumbent monop-
olistic firm and a potential entrant, where production by both firms causes polluting
emissions (environmental wastes or effluents). The government selects a tax per unit
of emission to maximize social welfare. Social welfare also takes into account the
social damage caused by the aggregate industry pollution. The magnitude of the emis-
sion tax affects the potential entrant’s decision whether or not to enter the market.
In particular, we investigate the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the
emission tax is chosen by the government. In the second stage, the potential entrant
decides whether or not it will enter the market. Finally, given the decision of the
potential entrant in the second stage, either the incumbent firm supplies the monopoly
output level in case entry did not occur or both firms compete in outputs in case of
entry.
Interestingly, we show that there are cases where both the government and the
incumbent firm prefer to establish the low monopoly output by introducing a rela-
tively high emission tax. In that case, the government deliberately induces profitable
monopolization of the market. Hence, in contrast to the aforementioned finding of
Buchanan and Tullock (1975), we show that a market-based instrument in the form of
environmental taxes can also effectively lead to monopolization of the market. From
the industry perspective, the incumbent firm may prefer a high emission tax if it creates
an entry barrier, hence providing more leeway to reap the fruits (higher profit) from a
higher degree of industry concentration. Moreover, the government may as well prefer
less competition because this could cause less damage to the environment, which has
a positive effect on social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the results derived from the model. We conclude in Section 4. Proofs and technical
details are given in the Appendix.
2 The model
Take a market with an incumbent firm (firm 1) and a potential entrant (firm 2). Both
firms supply a homogeneous product. The inverse demand function is p = a − bQ,
where p denotes the price, Q = q1 + q2 is output, and a, b > 0 are constants. Firm
2 incurs a fixed entry cost F > 0. Production costs of both firms are normalized to
zero. Production of one unit of output causes e > 0 units of polluting emissions.
The government imposes a tax τ ≥ 0 per unit of emission. The tax rate is set to
maximize social welfare W , comprising producer surplus (aggregate profits net of
taxes) P S, consumer surplus C S, aggregate tax revenues T , and the social valuation
of environmental damage caused by aggregate pollution D:
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Table 1 Equilibrium monopoly
and duopoly values Monopoly Duopoly
Output qm = Qm = a−τe2b qd1 = qd2 = a−τe3b
Qd = 2(a−τe)3b
Price pm = a+τe2 pd = a+2τe3






W = P S + C S + T − D. (1)
We write T = τeQ and D = λeQ, with λ > 0 denoting the marginal social damage
of environmental pollution (see also Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero 2002).
We employ a three-stage game to analyze the impact of environmental taxation on
social welfare and its subsequent effect on the market structure. In stage 1 the govern-
ment selects the emission tax rate τ , in stage 2 firm 2 decides whether or not to enter
and in stage 3 there is Cournot competition (if firm 2 decides to enter) or monopoly
(if firm 2 decides not to enter). As usual in such a setting the model is solved for the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Results
3.1 The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
We derive the equilibrium using backward induction. In the third stage the tax rate
τ ≥ 0 is given and two market cases need to be considered: monopoly and duopoly.
It is straightforward to derive the first-order conditions and the equilibrium values for
output, price and profit under both market configurations. The equilibrium values are
given in Table 1. To ensure outputs are positive, we need a − τe > 0. It turns out that
this holds in equilibrium.
In the second stage (again τ given) the entry decision of firm 2 is considered. Firm
2 enters the market if and only if its gross profit exceeds the fixed entry cost, i.e., if
(a−τe)2
9b − F > 0. Solving the zero-profit condition (a−τe)
2
9b = F , while focusing on
the case with a − τe > 0, one obtains:





Remark that τ > 0 if and only if F < a29b , i.e., if the fixed entry cost is small enough
given a and b.4 Furthermore, as expected, τ is a decreasing function of both F and e.
4 Note that τ = 0 if F = a29b . In that case firm 2 will never enter, which is uninteresting.
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That is, if F and/or e increases, then the zero-profit condition is fulfilled for smaller
τ . We now obtain:
Lemma 1 Suppose F < Fmax ≡ a29b . Let the tax rate τ be given (with a − τe > 0).
Then firm 2 will enter the market if τ < τ ; it will decide not to enter the market if
τ ≥ τ .
Notice that Lemma 1 implies that firm 2 will enter in case the government does not
impose an emission tax.
Finally, in the first stage the governmental authority selects the tax rate τ, given the
degree of pollution e. Let us first find the optimal tax rate given that firm 2 decides to
enter. Then in the duopoly social welfare reduces to (see Appendix):
W d = 4(a − τe)
2
9b
+ 2(a − τe)
3b
(τ − λ)e − F. (3)
The government maximizes social welfare (3) under the constraint that firm 2 does
enter, i.e., τ < τ . Solving dW d/dτ = 0 yields:





We now impose the following assumption on the parameters of the model:





Since we now examine the case where firm 2 decides to enter we need τ d < τ , which
is equivalent with λ < λmax . Furthermore, τ d > 0 if and only if λ > λmin . In other
words, if the latter inequality does not hold, then the government does not tax pollu-
tion at all in a duopoly. Clearly, this extreme case is less interesting. Remark also that
Assumption 1 implies λmin < λmax , which in turn means that the condition F < Fmax
of Lemma 1 is automatically satisfied.
It follows that τ d is the welfare-maximizing tax rate in the duopoly case. As
expected, this optimal tax rate is increasing in the marginal social damage of pol-
lution, λ, and the per unit emission, e. The tax rate is independent of F since the
government now accommodates entry of firm 2 and the output decision of this firm is
not affected by the fixed entry cost. Note that Assumption 1 implies that a − τ de > 0,
i.e., duopoly outputs are indeed positive.
Using the tax rate (4), the term a − τ de straightforwardly reduces to 32 (a − λe).
Subsequent substitution of this expression into (3) generates the following simplified
expression of social welfare under duopoly with the optimal tax rule (see Appendix):
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Let us now consider the case where firm 2 decides not to enter. Social welfare then
represents welfare under the monopoly structure, W m :
W m = 3(a − τe)
2
8b
+ (a − τe)
2b
(τ − λ)e. (6)
The government maximizes social welfare (6) under the constraint that firm 2 does
not enter, i.e., τ ≥ τ . Solving dW m/dτ = 0, we find the solution:
τˆ = 2λ − a
e
. (7)
However, comparing the monopoly tax rate (7) with the optimal tax rate (4) set under
a duopoly structure, it is easily seen that τˆ < τ d < τ , which, using Lemma 1, con-
tradicts the assumption that firm 2 will not enter in this case. Hence, the constraint is
binding and the government sets the tax rate τ = τm ≡ τ . Using this, social welfare
in the monopoly case becomes (see Appendix):





(a − λe) − 9F
8
. (8)
Remark that also here a − τme > 0, i.e., monopoly output is indeed positive.
For later use it is interesting to compare, while using the optimal tax rates, the profit
level of firm 1 in case firm 2 does not enter with the profit level of firm 1 if firm 2
decides to enter. These profits are given by, respectively:








(a − τ de)2
9b




This leads us to the following result:
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, under the optimal tax rules, the monop-
oly profit of firm 1 is larger than its duopoly profit, i.e., πm > πd1 , if and only if





Proof In Appendix. unionsq
It can be verified that 0 < λ1 < λmax . However, λ1 can be smaller or larger than
λmin .
We can solve for stage 1 by comparing social welfare with and without entry of
firm 2. We derive the following result for the equilibrium decision of the government.
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Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then in equilibrium the government selects









government selects τ = τ d otherwise.
Proof In Appendix. unionsq
We observe that 0 < λ1 < λ2 < λmax , and that λ2 can be smaller or larger than
λmin .
3.2 Main result
Combining the above Lemmas, we present our main proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Define F1 ≡ 4a281b and F2 ≡ 16a
2
9(3+2√2)2b
(with 0 < F1 < F2 < Fmax ) and take λ1 and λ2 as defined in Lemmas 2 and 3.
We then have the following in equilibrium for different values of F ∈ (0, Fmax ) and
λ ∈ (λmin, λmax ):
Case (a) Let 0 < F < F1. Then λmin < λ1 < λ2 < λmax , and
(i) λmin < λ < λ1 ⇒ τ = τ d and πd1 > πm,
(ii) λ1 < λ < λ2 ⇒ τ = τ d and πm > πd1 ,
(iii) λ2 < λ < λmax ⇒ τ = τm and πm > πd1 .
Case (b) Let F1 < F < F2. Then λ1 < λmin < λ2 < λmax , and
(iv) λmin < λ < λ2 ⇒ τ = τ d and πm > πd1 ,
(v) λ2 < λ < λmax ⇒ τ = τm and πm > πd1 .
Case (c) Let F2 < F < Fmax . Then λ1 < λ2 < λmin < λmax , and
(vi) λmin < λ < λmax ⇒ τ = τm and πm > πd1 .
Proof In Appendix. unionsq
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the various (sub)cases of Proposition 1.
It identifies the regions which correspond to cases (i)–(vi) for different values of the
marginal social damage of pollution, λ ∈ [0, a/e], and the fixed entry cost, F ∈
[0, Fmax ]. To get the functional relations as shown in the figure, we set a = 10, b = 2
and e = 3. Consequently F1, F2, Fmax and λmin are fixed. Then one can draw λ1, λ2
and λmax as a function of the fixed entry cost. At F = 0, λ1 = λ2 = λmax = a/e.
Furthermore, we see that λ1 < λ2 < λmax for all F > 0. The relevant cases are all in
the range λ > λmin . Since F1 and F2 are close to each other, the regions where case
(iv) and (v) hold are relatively small, as is case (ii). The regions that hold for case (i),
(iii) and (vi) are biggest in size. To discuss Proposition 1 further, let us develop some
intuition.
It can be verified that entry of firm 2 always leads to a lower price and higher
industry output, resulting in a higher summation of aggregate profits, consumer sur-
plus and tax revenues compared to the monopoly case. This has a positive effect on
123
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Fig. 1 Graphical representation of (sub)cases of Proposition 1
social welfare. On the other hand, both the fixed entry fee and higher aggregate envi-
ronmental pollution adversely affect social welfare. Yet if we take the extreme case
where F and λ are small, these negative effects are less important and the government
prefers duopoly, i.e., it sets τ = τ d . On the other hand, when the fixed entry cost
is relatively large, say approaching Fmax , then λmax becomes close to λmin . In that
case, the adverse effects of the fixed entry fee and higher aggregate environmental
pollution will dominate the positive effects of entry by firm 2, and the government
will prefer monopoly, i.e., it sets τ = τm . This intuition explains what happens with
the tax rate set by the government if we compare cases (i)–(vi) of Proposition 1 for
gradually increasing values of F and/or λ.
Let us now focus on the effects of changes in F and λ on the profit of firm 1.
Clearly, if we would have the same tax rate in monopoly and duopoly, firm 1 would
prefer monopoly since then it faces no competition and can keep its higher monopoly
profit. However, in our model, the tax rate in monopoly is larger than the tax rate in
duopoly, i.e., τm > τ d . Further, if F and/or λ become smaller, the difference between
τm and τ d becomes larger. In that case it might happen that the difference between
the tax rates becomes so large that firm 1 prefers duopoly with its relatively much
smaller tax rate. This explains what happens with the profit of firm 1 in cases (i)–(vi)
of Proposition 1 for different values of F and/or λ.
Next, let us examine the interest of the government jointly with the interest of the
incumbent firm. We make three observations. First, we have identified the conditions
where the governmental and firm 1’s interests coincide in the sense of deterring entry
of firm 2. These conditions are given by cases (iii), (v) and (vi) of Proposition 1, where
the government prefers monopoly above duopoly and imposes a correspondingly high
tax rate. This discourages entry of firm 2, which is profitable to firm 1, and a low
monopoly output level can be established. Second, there are also situations where the
interests of the government and firm 1 do not coincide. They are given by cases (ii) and
(iv) of Proposition 1. Here the government prefers duopoly with its positive effects on
social welfare, whereas firm 1 prefers monopoly, even though the tax rate would be
higher in that case. Third, in case (i) the interests of the government and firm 1 coincide
123
102 L. Schoonbeek, F. P. de Vries
again, but now in the sense that both prefer duopoly. Given our discussion above the
reason for this coincidence of interests is clear, i.e., F and λ are small in this case.
We notice that in order to simplify the presentation we have not considered in Prop-
osition 1 the cases where F = F1, F = F2, λ = λ1 or λ = λ2. The results for those
cases are obvious and less interesting.
3.3 Some additional remarks
To complete the analytical picture, let us compare the size of the emission tax rate
with the marginal social damage caused by pollution, which is common practice in
the literature (see e.g., Barnett 1980; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas 1995). Using (4)
we see that τ d < λ if and only if λ < a/e, which is always true given Assump-
tion 1. Intuitively, the government sets the (duopoly) tax rate lower than the mar-
ginal pollution damage in order to mitigate the distortion that exists due to imperfect
competition (market power) in the duopolistic output market (cf. the aforementioned
references). Turning to τm , Eq. 7 yields that τm < λ if and only if a − 3√bF < λe.
Substituting F = 0 and invoking Assumption 1, we see that this inequality does
not hold. On the contrary, if F = Fmax , then the inequality is true. Hence, there
exists a threshold Fˆ(λ) such that τm < λ if and only if F ∈ (Fˆ(λ), Fmax ). Intu-
itively, if F is small, i.e., if F ∈ (0, Fˆ(λ)), then the government sets a high tax
rate in order to deter entry by firm 2, i.e., τm > λ. However, if F is large, i.e., if
F ∈ (Fˆ(λ), Fmax ), then entry is already deterred for small tax rates and the govern-
ment again tries to mitigate the output distortion in the monopolistic output market,
i.e., τm < λ.
One of our simplifications comprised the normalization of production costs to zero.
Although this variable does not affect the optimal tax rates in our version of the model,
they can easily be included. For instance, assume that both firms have the same con-
stant marginal production costs, c > 0. Furthermore, suppose that the inverse demand
function is given by p˜ = a˜ − bQ. Analyzing this modified model is formally equiva-
lent to analyzing our original model if we write the demand intercept as a = a˜ −c and
the price as p = p˜ − c. In other words, we now interpret the price p in the original
model as the price net of marginal production costs (see also Amir and Jin 2001).5
Substitution of a = a˜ − c in (2) and (4) gives expressions of the optimal tax rates
depending on the marginal production costs as well. Using (2) the effect of a change
in the marginal production costs on the monopoly tax rate is dτm/dc = −1/e < 0;
employing (4) we find for the duopoly case dτ d/dc = 1/(2e) > 0. Let us first provide
the intuition for the former result. Recall that the monoply tax rate is determined by
the zero-profit condition of the potential entrant (firm 2). Now, if marginal production
costs c increase, then, at a constant tax rate, firm 2’s profit goes down. This implies that
the monopoly tax rate fulfilling the zero-profit condition can decrease. With respect
to the second comparative statics result, note that the optimal tax rate under a duop-
oly is determined by the government’s welfare maximization problem (3). Now sup-
pose again that the marginal production costs c increase. Then, keeping the tax rate
5 For example, in the monopoly case the profit of firm 1 can be written as pQ − τeQ = ( p˜ − c)Q − τeQ.
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constant, the duopoly price goes up and total output goes down, which leads to a
decrease of social welfare. In order to mitigate this negative impact on welfare the
government will accordingly adjust the duopoly tax rate in an upward fashion, since
this increases aggregate tax revenues net of the aggregate social damage caused by
pollution (T − D).
As a final remark, note that our analysis concentrated on a linear modeling struc-
ture. However, the same modelling routine was conducted for a quadratic environ-
mental damage function of the form D = λ(eQ)2 (see also Poyago-Theotoky and
Teerasuwannajak 2002). Again employing backward induction, the results of stages
3 and 2 remain unaffected for this modified environmental damage function, hence
Lemma 1 and the equilibrium values as included in Table 1 still apply. It further appears
that qualitatively, i.e., under appropriate changes of the relevant thresholds, Lemmas 2
and 3 as well as our main Proposition 1, also hold for the quadratic specification of
the damage function.6
4 Conclusions
It is known from the literature that direct environmental control measures, such as
output quota of polluting products, might lead to monopolization or “cartelization” of
markets. Such a situation is usually welcomed by the industries’ incumbent firm(s).
This paper, instead, investigates this issue in terms of the use of a market-based envi-
ronmental policy instrument, in particular an emission tax. We employ a three-stage
game to identify the market conditions under which a government’s preference and
the preference of an incumbent monopolistic firm coincide in case of environmental
taxation. Key in our analysis is to what extent the optimal tax rate set by the govern-
ment affects the degree of competition and the subsequent output level. The incumbent
firm might prefer a high emission tax if this discourages a potential rival to enter the
market, which ensures the monopoly profit for the incumbent. The government might
prefer such a high tax because of its discouraging effect on competition, hence keep-
ing a monopoly in place, and implying less environmental damage. Depending on the
marginal social damage of environmental pollution and the fixed entry cost of the
potential entrant, less competition could imply higher overall welfare. In sum, a
market-based social-welfare maximizing environmental tax instrument can also
induce profitable monopolization of a market.
One should be cautious in generalizing the results given the linear properties of the
model. On the other hand, allowing for a non-linear specification of demand, output
and environmental damage comes at the cost of analytical tractability, however. We
nevertheless were able to analytically solve the model for a quadratic specification of
the environmental damage function and qualitatively all the results derived in this paper
hold for such a case as well. Allowing for additional non-linear modeling features is
left for future research.
6 The formal proofs of these results are available from the authors upon request.
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Appendix: Proofs and technical details
Derivation of social welfare function (3) under duopoly: Producer surplus under a
duopoly is just the sum of πd1 and πd2 . Taking the expressions from Table 1 yields
2(a−τe)2
9b − F. Consumer surplus reads:





2 (a − τe)
3b
(
a − a + 2τe
3
)




The aggregate tax revenues minus the social valuation of environmental damage be-
comes:
T − D = Qd(τ − λ)e
= 2 (a − τe)
3b
(τ − λ)e.
Finally, combining the welfare terms according to (1) yields (3). unionsq
Derivation of social welfare function (5) under duopoly given optimal tax rule: Using
the optimal duopoly tax rate τ = τ d = 3λ2 − a2e , the term a−τ de can straightforwardly
be written as 32 (a − λe). Substitution of the latter into the social welfare function (3)
then yields:

















= (a − λe)
2
b
+ (a − λe)
b
· (λe − a)
2
− F




We have found (5). unionsq
Derivation of social welfare function (8) under monopoly given optimal tax rule: Using




and substituting this into (6) yields
the social welfare function according to:
W m(τm) = 3
8b














(a − λe) − 9F
2
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(a − λe) − 9F
8
.
We have derived (8). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2 Using (9) and (10), and invoking Assumption 1, one can verify that




. Together with Assumption 1 this gives Lemma 2. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3 First, using (5) and (8) we have:
W d < W m
⇐⇒ (a − λe)
2
2b





(a − λe) − 9F
8












⇐⇒ (a − λe)2 + bF
4
< 3 (a − λe)√bF . (A1)
Next, introducing the auxiliary variable x ≡ a − λe, we can rewrite (A1) as:
x2 − 3x√bF + bF
4
< 0.





that Assumption 1 implies that x > 2
√





bF . Hence, (A1) is fulfilled for 2√bF < x < x1. Defining λ2 ≡ a−x1e ,
and using Assumption 1, we obtain Lemma 3. unionsq




, can be rewritten













, can be rear-
ranged as F < 16a29(3+2√2)2b (≈
0.0523a2
b ). Combining this with Lemmas 2 and 3 yields
Proposition 1. unionsq
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